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Low-Income Countries?
by Simone Cecchini, Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have worked
fairly well in large upper middle-income countries such as Brazil
and Mexico. But this does not mean that the CCT model can be
exported to all countries, especially the poorest. As the table shows,
programmes in low-income countries are reaching a much smaller
share of their population and of the extremely poor. The number
of beneficiaries of CCT programmes in Brazil and Mexico is larger
than the number of the extremely poor, whereas in Nicaragua the
beneficiaries are equivalent to 7.8 per cent of the extremely poor
population. Low-income countries also have a much more limited
capacity to spend on these programmes. For instance, Mexico
invests 0.44 per cent of its GDP and 4.3 per cent of total social
spending in CCTs, while Honduras invests 0.02 per cent of GDP
and 0.2 per cent of social spending.
A recent paper on Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua reveals
the challenges that CCT programmes face in small, low-income
countries with weak institutional settings (Cecchini et al., 2009).
First, because of their multidimensional approach to poverty
reduction, CCT programmes require coordination among the
different sectors and territorial units of the state. In the Central
American countries cited above, however, state institutions
are quite fragile and coordination is far from effective.
In Honduras, an attempt is being made to coordinate efforts to fight
poverty by means of the Red Solidaria. But there is still an overlap
of actions between the Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF), which
is the nationally financed cash transfer programme, and the pilot
programme funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
Guatemala has no Ministry of Social Development and its CCT
programme, Mi Familia Progresa (MFP), was launched in 2008 without
sufficient coordination with the education and health sectors.
Second, successful and sustainable programmes must endure
over time and be considered as a state policy that is not subject
to governmental change. This entails setting up state-based
funding mechanisms, not simply depending on foreign donors.
In Nicaragua, the Red de Protección Social (RPS), financed by an IDB
loan, was reasonably successful, but the present government
replaced it with other poverty reduction initiatives such as
Hambre Cero and Usura Cero.
Third, CCT programmes require an ability to implement
and manage sound and transparent beneficiary information and
payment systems. Low-income countries, however, often have weak
statistical capacity and fragile banking systems. Guatemala lacks an
information management system to register beneficiaries. Payments
are made in cash at mass events often attended by the first lady.
In Nicaragua, the RPS cash transfers were distributed by security
companies hired for that purpose.
In Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which are marked by
widespread poverty, geographical or other categorical targeting
for poverty reduction programmes may be sufficient. Second-level
targeting based on complex proxy means tests may lead to the
exclusion of potential beneficiaries, as well as to tensions and
feelings of discrimination. Similarly, conditioning cash transfers
on school attendance or health check-ups is somewhat
inappropriate in areas where these services are either absent
or of dismal quality. It is equally unsuitable to announce the
imposition of conditionalities when the proper information
systems are lacking.
It is thus quite evident that in low-income countries funds should
be devoted not only to increasing the demand for social services
but also to expanding their supply. Efforts in that direction were
made with RPS in Nicaragua and are under way as part of the PRAF
in Honduras. These CCT programmes include cash transfers for the
provision of education and health services in order to meet
the increased demand that they generate.
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Coverage and Investment of Selected CCT Programmes
Country
(programme), year % of total
population
% of GDP
Brazil (Bolsa Família), 2006 22.7 > 100.0 0.43 2.0
Mexico (Oportunidades), 2006 23.8 > 100.0 0.44 4.3
Guatemala (MFP), 2008 13.6 46.7 0.06 0.8
Honduras (PRAF), 2006 6.8 14.9 0.02 0.2
Nicaragua (RPS), 2006 2.5 7.8 0.04 0.4
% of social
spending
Coverage Investment in CCT
% of extremely
poora